The loss suffered by unsecured creditors of all insolvent companies is the non-payment in full of amounts rightfully owed to them. This loss is all the more unacceptable to creditors when a company has been illegally phoenixed by the transfer from the insolvent company of assets at undervalue. One way of increasing the pool of funds available for distribution to creditors is to issue proceedings seeking compensation against directors alleging that their 'phoenixing' amounted to a breach of directors' duties or insolvent trading. Such an action may be instigated by the liquidator and by ASIC. ASIC's enforcement role can be contrasted with the recovery role of the liquidator where the latter acts primarily in the furtherance of private interests, being those of the insolvent company's creditors; ASIC's mandate, on the other hand, is to act in the public interest. The purpose of this article is to examine the enforcement roles of liquidators and ASIC where suspected illegal phoenix activity has occurred. Following consideration of the difficulties faced by liquidators acting on behalf of creditors of phoenixed companies, this article considers whether it is appropriate, from a policy perspective, for the public regulator to promote private interests by exercising its enforcement powers for the benefit of creditors. The argument in favour of a publicly funded regulator seeking compensation for creditor losses is particularly compelling in the context of illegal phoenix activity, given the inability of creditors to bring enforcement proceedings themselves and the difficulties faced by liquidators when they seek redress for creditors' losses.
I INTRODUCTION
There are many practical impediments faced by plaintiffs when they seek redress for civil wrongs. These impediments, which are often discussed in the context of the access to justice debate, include issues of the cost and complexity of litigation, the structure of
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Volume 44 _____________________________________________________________________________________ for creditor losses is particularly compelling in the context of illegal phoenix activity, given the inability of creditors to bring enforcement proceedings themselves and the difficulties faced by liquidators when they seek redress for creditors' losses. However, the article also notes recent concerns about ASIC's enforcement record in any context. 8 This article is divided into five parts. Part II examines the difficulties faced by creditors of insolvent companies that have been phoenixed and explains the liquidation process that imposes a collective recovery regime. Part III examines the role of liquidators and the factors that restrict their ability to obtain redress for the losses suffered by unsecured creditors. Part IV examines the role of ASIC and considers, in light of the difficulties faced by liquidators in successfully running recovery proceedings, whether seeking compensation from directors of phoenixed companies in order to facilitate recovery for unsecured creditors is an appropriate use of its resources. Part V concludes.
II CREDITORS' AVENUES FOR REDRESS FOR UNPAID DEBTS IN INSOLVENCY
The basic tenet of company law is that the company is a separate legal entity, so the debts that it incurs -whether tax debts, accrued employee entitlements or unpaid suppliers -are the debts of the company and not of its directors, managers or shareholders. Shareholders enjoy limited liability, meaning that they are not liable to contribute further funds to the company once their shares are fully paid. 9 Creditor self-protection plays a major part in the traditional theoretical justification for shareholder limited liability. Ex ante, creditors are expected to seek security, either from the debtor company or its controllers, or else charge more for goods and services to compensate for the occasional loss. 10 However, these arguments do not hold for all creditors. For example, small trade creditors are unlikely to have the bargaining power to obtain security or charge a premium, and the preferential status of secured creditors such as banks exacerbates the financially tenuous position of these unsecured creditors.
Where companies are solvent, creditors may initiate private enforcement actions against them for unpaid debts. However, once the company is insolvent, debt recovery must take place through the process of liquidation. 11 Once a company has entered liquidation, the rights of individual creditors to recover from the debtor company are stayed 12 13 Ibid ss 555, 556.
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The Public Enforcement of Sanctions against Illegal Phoenix Activity 205 _____________________________________________________________________________________ are paid by the liquidator from a pool of funds once the assets of the company are collected and realised. 14 Liquidation as a collective recovery regime theoretically makes good sense. It removes the wasteful and potentially inefficient realisation of the company's assets by individual creditors. This leads to administrative efficiencies at the time of liquidation. The collective scheme is intended to result in an increased aggregate pool of assets. 15 In other words, the total amount received by creditors as a group is as much or more than the sum of what they would have received if they had enforced the claims individually. 16 In exchange for receiving these benefits, creditors 'agree' to stay their rights to take individual action. Many creditors are assumed to be risk averse, and to prefer to receive a more certain, lesser sum than a less certain, greater one. 17 It takes away the benefits of being the first creditor to claim, 18 and therefore avoids costly and duplicative monitoring of the company's solvency. 19 Nonetheless, by definition, the pool of funds available for distribution will not be sufficient to meet all creditors' claims. 20 The difficulties faced by unsecured creditors in securing payment of their debts may be exacerbated where illegal phoenix activity has occurred. A phoenix company is one that arises from the ashes of its failed former self. There are a variety of definitions used by regulators and other stakeholders 21 18 Jackson calls this 'the race to the courthouse': Jackson, above n 15, 862. 19 If creditors knew their own ability to recover was based upon being the first to initiate action, they would each spend time and money monitoring the company's solvency. The costs of monitoring would be passed on to the company, making goods and services more expensive. This would affect the profitability of the enterprise or else the company would in turn pass these costs on to their own customers. 20 22 While the term 'phoenix company' can be used to describe the perfectly legal, even desirable, rescue of a viable business through a new corporate entity, generally it is used in a pejorative sense to capture some aspect of impropriety on the part of the defunct company's controllers. Illegal phoenix activity involves company controllers closing down one company with the deliberate intention of leaving its debts unpaid within that insolvent entity, and then transferring 'the business' -assets, goodwill, premises, possibly a similar name -to a newly created company. A common feature is that the assets are transferred for little or no consideration, leaving the failed company without the means to meet its obligations. The illegality stems from this improper intention to exploit the corporate form -the separate legal entity of the company and the limited liability of its shareholders -to the detriment of unsecured creditors. This behaviour breaches directors' duties 23 and can also attract criminal sanction. 24 The avenues for recovery of amounts unpaid by phoenixed companies largely depend upon who the victim is. This is the case in all liquidations, whether or not phoenix activity is involved. Those who suffer most from illegal phoenix activity are the ATO and its state revenue office counterparts. The ATO is responsible for gathering taxes such as income tax, including Pay-As-You-Go deductions withheld from employees' pay packets (PAYG(W)), as well as the superannuation guarantee charge (SGC) which is levied on employers who fail to make super contributions to employees' nominated funds. The state revenue offices gather taxes such as land tax and payroll tax. Each of these taxes is susceptible to non-payment through illegal phoenix activity because the primary liability falls on the failed company and not on its controllers or shareholders.
Employees are significant victims of illegal phoenix activity because their unpaid wages, leave entitlements, payments in lieu of notice and redundancy entitlements are often sizable debts of the failed company. Where a company is deliberately liquidated to shed debts, the employees are likely to lose not only their entitlements but also their employment. While the newly created company may take on some or even all of the defunct company's employees, those employees have no legal rights to demand that it does so. Employees enjoy the status of priority creditors and are also the beneficiaries of a taxpayer-funded scheme, discussed below. In some instances, dismissing employees and forcing them to seek government advances to cover their entitlements may be the reason that motivates the company's closure.
Trade creditors are frequently the victims of illegal phoenix activity. These include suppliers of goods or services to the failed company. Unlike lenders owed large amounts who seek security over the company's assets or a personal guarantee from company controllers, trade creditors may not seek any security from the company either because their debts are relatively small or because they lack the bargaining power to insist upon it. Therefore they are likely to recover little or nothing after the liquidation process has been completed. However, not all trade creditors are necessarily treated the same. 24 Ibid s 184.
The Public Enforcement of Sanctions against Illegal Phoenix Activity 207 _____________________________________________________________________________________ may be treated more favourably, especially if the newly formed company needs to continue purchasing from that supplier. This commonly occurs through secret arrangements where the new company or its controllers pay the amount owed by the defunct company. This is unjust to those creditors who will receive nothing. Customers of the failed company who have prepaid for goods or services fall into this same category.
Competitors of the phoenix company are the final group of victims of illegal phoenix activity. Some companies tender for work based on their intention to liquidate, leaving the unpaid debts of taxes, wages and suppliers quarantined within the failed entity. They then commence business again through a new company and repeat the process. Law-abiding competitors are undercut by this cheaper tendering and may genuinely be driven out of business. This may lead to them also engaging in illegal phoenix activity through their next company. Haines notes the significance of economic pressures on business and comments that '[i]f the profit levels are so tight that … compliance is not compatible with staying in business, then … non-compliance is the likely result.' 25 Because of the damage done by phoenix activity to all of these groups, deterrence of deliberate behaviour to shed debts is a vital public benefit, and public interest considerations have led to both revenue authorities and employees having special means of recovery. Where the victim is a revenue authority such as the ATO or a state revenue office, the roles of victim and regulator with powers to seek recovery are combined. Revenue authorities can, like other unsecured creditors, prove their debts in the liquidation of the company and receive a pro rata payment of the amount owed. In addition, the ATO in particular has a suite of tools that it can use to recover from the directors of the company personally. 26 For example, directors who fail to cause their company to remit PAYG(W) taxes or pay superannuation can be subject to personal liability for these amounts if they do not promptly place the company into liquidation or voluntary administration. 27 This is available to the ATO whether or not the directors had an improper intention in failing to remit the amounts on behalf of the company. The ATO may also seek a security bond where there is a suspicion that tax may not be remitted in future. 28 As noted above, employees are priority creditors in the liquidation 29 and are also the beneficiaries of a reasonably generous taxpayer-funded scheme. 30 In addition, employees have a degree of support from 'champions' such as their trade union and the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO). However, this does not necessarily mean that employees are fully compensated for what they are owed. The statutory priority under s 556(1)(e)-(h) is useful where an employer company has some assets remaining after paying the costs of the liquidation but is cold comfort where the assets of that company have been removed from the company as a result of illegal phoenix activity. 30 The General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme ('GEERS') was the taxpayerfunded safety net scheme for unpaid wages and other entitlements for employees of insolvent employers. This was replaced by the Fair Entitlements Guarantee in 2012.
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Federal Law Review Volume 44 _____________________________________________________________________________________ taxpayer funded scheme, currently in the form of the Fair Entitlements Guarantee (FEG), partly makes up for that deficiency but is subject to limits. 31 The FWO may commence action against the errant employer for failure to pay wages as a breach of the Fair Work Act 32 as well as against the company's controllers for their involvement in this breach. 33 However, such action is subject to the FWO's own resource constraints regarding litigation, 34 and is not a means by which the employee victims of illegal phoenix activity can recover the amounts owing to them. 35 Unions have the right to bring actions for enforcement of some provisions of the Fair Work Act 36 but are themselves subject to resource constraints. 37 Other unsecured creditors such as trade creditors and customers who have made prepayments, are, by comparison, friendless. As discussed, they lack the ability to sue once the company has entered liquidation. 38 More than most other creditors, the ability of unsecured trade creditors to recover amounts owing to them is in the hands of the liquidator, and to some extent, ASIC. For this reason, they are the focus of this paper. The next Part examines the role of the liquidator in promoting the interests of the unsecured creditors and in playing a quasi-regulatory role on behalf of ASIC.
III THE ENFORCEMENT ROLE OF LIQUIDATORS
The liquidation process itself is usually initiated by a creditor issuing the debtor company with a statutory demand to pay a specified amount. If it remains unsatisfied at the end of 21 days and the company has not applied to have it set aside, 39 a creditor can then apply to have the company wound up in insolvency 40 which the court may order. 41 A liquidator is appointed and is given a wide variety of powers 42 together the company's assets for the purpose of distributing them in accordance with the priorities specified in the Act. 43 One way of improving the position of unsecured creditors is to increase the pool of funds that is available to the liquidator. This could be done through a successful action against the directors of the company alleging that they have breached their duty. As stated above, illegal phoenix activity may constitute a breach of a director's duty to act for a proper purpose, and not to misuse their position to make a gain for themselves or someone else or cause detriment to the company. 44 If the transfer of assets from the failed company for undervalue constitutes an uncommercial transaction, directors may also breach the duty to prevent insolvent trading. 45 While creditors have some direct recovery rights against directors with respect to insolvent trading, these may only be exercised with the liquidator's consent or leave of the court. 46 This requirement, and the stay on legal action by unsecured creditors that comes into being on the making of the winding up order, means that creditor recovery is largely in the hands of a third party, the liquidator.
Where the liquidator issues an enforcement action against directors alleging a breach of duty or insolvent trading, the remedy sought is compensation. It is essentially a private enforcement action because the liquidator acts on behalf of an individual company against its directors for the purpose of correcting a wrong done to that company. Compensation is traditionally seen as a private remedy designed to deliver corrective justice for harm that has been done to victims personally. 47 The victims of a phoenix company are its creditors and the harm is the reduction in funds that was caused by the phoenix activity of the directors. Any compensation ordered against the directors is paid to the company for the ultimate benefit of those unsecured creditors.
However, the ability of the liquidator to obtain this compensation, and indeed to perform all of the tasks within their remit, is impacted by the amount of assets held by the company at the time of its liquidation. It determines the scope of the investigation that they are able to undertake and the likelihood of recovery actions being issued against directors. The very act of stripping assets from the failing company through illegal phoenix activity not only deprives its creditors of their recovery but also limits the ability of the liquidator to perform their role. By the time an illegally phoenixed company is referred to a liquidator for the purpose of formally ending its existence, there may be few or no assets left to fund investigations or recovery actions against the directors, and liquidators have no incentive to accept the engagement.
In some cases the stripping of the assets may lead to the company not being placed into liquidation at all. If no creditor comes forward to finance the liquidation and there 43 Ibid s 556. 44 
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Federal Law Review Volume 44 _____________________________________________________________________________________ are insufficient funds within the company to cover the liquidator's fees and expenses, the insolvent company is likely to remain dormant until ASIC decides to deregister it for failure to submit required returns and pay annual fees. 48 ASIC's ability to wind up abandoned companies and seek their liquidation is noted below in Part IV, but at this point, it should be noted that the creditors of these companies can only rely on ASIC for enforcement action against any wrongdoers. The Government's Assetless Administration Fund (AAF) was set up with the purpose of paying for assetless administrations. 49 However it generally does not cover the liquidation costs of asset recoveries except in specified circumstances. 50 Since 2012, these circumstances are suspected fraudulent or unlawful phoenix activity. 51 However, in order to qualify for AAF funding, the liquidator must have obtained sufficient evidence to support the banning or enforcement action. 52 The scheme therefore relies on a liquidator making substantial inquiries, paid for out of their own pocket or directly by the creditors, prior to being funded by the AAF, and also being willing to prepare the detailed paperwork of the funding application. 53 Exacerbating the difficulties for creditors is the advent of the turnaround specialist. These unregulated 54 business advisory services are believed to advise companies in financial difficulties to engage in illegal phoenix activity as a means of saving their businesses from the burden of debt. 55 57 Nonetheless, the importance of sending a clear message of deterrence is highlighted where some advisors are complicit in wrongdoing. Obtaining compensation for those creditors adversely affected by that wrongdoing, and publicising it well, would achieve that public benefit as well as overcoming the damage caused.
In addition to fulfilling their traditional role, it should be recognised that liquidators also serve a public interest role. While the Corporations Act empowers liquidators to finalise the affairs of companies being wound up, recover company assets including through litigation, and distribute them amongst eligible creditors, 58 it also requires liquidators to report a number of matters to ASIC. 59 A central part of this reporting relates to misconduct before and during external administrations by corporate controllers. Liquidators notify ASIC whether they suspect the conduct breaches civil penalty or criminal laws, including those breaches that occur in the phoenix context, and whether they hold documentary evidence to support their claims. This is vital intelligence that ASIC uses to select cases to pursue further. It is no exaggeration to say that no-one is as close to the affairs of a failed company as its liquidator and therefore no-one else can determine whether it is a legal or illegal phoenix with the same degree of experience and knowledge of the law. ASIC's 2014-15 Annual Report noted that 'ASIC allocates its resources to achieve the greatest market impact. With less resources, we are generally unable to conduct random sampling-based surveillance. Instead, we focus on strategically important gatekeepers to direct surveillance resources towards the risks that pose the greatest threat.' 60 ASIC rightly points out that '[e]xternal administrators are the front-line investigators of insolvent corporations.' 61 Their work contributes towards '(a) maintaining the integrity of the marketplace; and (b) promoting investor and consumer confidence.' 62 The investigation and detection roles of liquidators have also been judicially acknowledged. 63 The directors' duties that may be enforced by the liquidator in the context of illegal phoenix activity are civil penalty provisions. This means that ASIC is also able to play an enforcement role, and this is examined in the next Part. Given the difficulties faced by liquidators in recovering on behalf of creditors, particularly in phoenix situations, and the work done by liquidators to assist ASIC in phoenix detection, we now turn to consider what ASIC may do to assist them. 
IV THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC REGULATOR
There are a number of enforcement mechanisms at ASIC's disposal if it suspects that a company's controllers have engaged in illegal phoenix activity. 64 As noted above, one of those mechanisms is a civil penalty application issued against the directors personally, seeking compensation for an alleged breach of duty. ASIC may also seek director disqualification and/or pecuniary penalties, 65 other types of director disqualifications instigated either via a court application 66 or an internal administrative procedure, 67 and the winding up of dormant companies. 68 This final mechanism acts as a small contribution to creditor compensation through the appointment of a liquidator, although its very limited scope 69 and its few uses 70 confirm that this process is of relatively little benefit to creditors generally. The only real benefit is to employees as it provides them with access to the Fair Entitlements Guarantee, allowing for the potential of obtaining compensation. However, it plays no 'public benefit' role by causing a wrongdoer to pay in some way for their action.
Public enforcement is not constrained by the same factors that constrain private enforcement such as a lack of assets to fund investigations and litigation. In addition, liquidators must take into account the likelihood of recovery, should the action against the director be successful. Regardless of the culpability of the director, a liquidator is unlikely to take action if they believe the director does not have sufficient personal assets to meet a judgment debt. 71 This is not a factor that needs to constrain the public regulator. This Part now considers whether ASIC should use its limited resources to seek compensation that will ultimately benefit creditors of companies that have been phoenixed. First, we consider whether ASIC should do so to enhance compliance. Secondly, we consider whether compensation should be sought even if compliance were not enhanced. Finally, we consider the background to ASIC's compensation power and comment upon its subsequent use.
A The Compliance Focused View of Public Regulation
This section starts from the perspective that the objective of a public regulator is to secure future compliance. It argues that obtaining compensation for victims is an appropriate use of the regulator's resources, provided that it achieves that objective and does not detract from it. In the phoenix context, it can be done by bringing a civil penalty application alleging a contravention of the duties owed by directors and seeking a compensation order.
In order to explore the role of a public regulator in this context, it is useful first to consider the role of public regulation more generally. Black defines regulation as 'the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes'. 72 According to Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, the primary aim of regulation is to reduce behaviour that is harmful to others by either preventing an individual from engaging in it or by deterring others from doing so. 73 The OECD defines regulation as that which 'serve[s] clearly identified policy goals', 74 and Haines says the role of regulation is to 'attempt to bring about a clearly defined end'. 75 The behaviour that requires modification in the phoenix context is the misuse of the corporate form to deliberately avoid the payment of debts, generally by the transfer of assets at an undervalue. Therefore, from a normative perspective, regulation of phoenix activity should deliver a sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of persons who would otherwise engage in this type of activity. It should have the clearly defined policy goal, or clearly defined end, of reducing its future incidence and the future losses to unsecured creditors that would be caused by it. 76 Directors' Duty of Oversight ' (2012) [r]egulatory sanctions are an essential feature of a regulatory enforcement toolkit and are central to achieving compliance by signalling the threat of a punishment for firms that have offended. Sanctions demonstrate that non-compliance will not be tolerated and that there will be a reprimand or consequence that will put the violator in a worse position than those entities that complied with their regulatory obligations on time. 78 The potential for problems to arise when public regulators seek to promote private interests was recognized by the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills ('BIS') in its 2012 consultation paper entitled Private Actions in Competition Law: A Consultation on Options for Reform. 79 Although focused on private enforcement in the competition context, the consultation paper includes a useful discussion of the role of a public regulator, the UK Office of Fair Trading ('OFT'), in facilitating redress. The BIS noted that 'alongside a strong private actions regime, the Government recognises that there are some situations where it may be appropriate for the public enforcement body to consider mechanisms for redress, as part of its administrative settlement of cases.' 80 However, the Department also acknowledged that a compensatory role should not detract from the regulators' role in detecting, investigating and sanctioning activity that contravenes the laws or regulations: 81 Whilst recognising that any involvement in delivering redress would involve some resource implications, the Government would not wish the OFT to become so involved in the business of quantifying the degree of loss suffered by consumers or business that this led to an impairment in carrying out its other functions. To divert resources away from or delay enforcement activities in order to help facilitate compensation could cause a reduction in deterrence and therefore an increase in anticompetitive behaviour. 82 The UK Government agreed with this approach, and in its response to the BIS report, stated that the Government considers that the primary duty of the OFT will be to enforce the competition regime and undertake studies and investigations in the competition regime. Any work therefore that the OFT will undertake on redress schemes would be in addition to this primary competition work, and should not be a substantial burden on resource. 
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Deterrence theory relies on the economic premise that members of the regulated community will internalise the cost of non-compliance and if this cost can be set at a sufficiently high level, would-be non-compliers will comply with the law. 84 This can be contrasted with private enforcement which serves private interests and is traditionally associated with notions of corrective justice. 85 Scholars who support a compensatory role for public regulators point to synergies in the regulatory outcomes that can flow from both public and private enforcement. They allow regulators to promote both the interests of the victim of the regulatory contravention; by seeking an order designed to provide corrective justice, such as a compensation order; while at the same time furthering the public interest by seeking an order designed to provide distributive justice and deterrence, such as a fine or some sort of disqualification order. For example, Ezrachi and Ioannidou argue that a private enforcement action can also serve a deterrent function. They believe that private damages claims can provide a public interest outcome because they 'not only serve as a channel for corrective justice, but also supplement the deterrent function of public enforcement.' 86 Hodges argues that from an economic perspective, the costs of non-compliance can equally well be produced by fines imposed by public authorities (whether enforcement authorities or courts) as by damages and costs imposed by private actions. Both mechanisms involve the same medium, money and pressure is therefore both equal and transferable between the two mechanisms. 87 If both traditional public enforcement mechanisms, such as fines, and private damages claims can result in deterrence, then it should also be true that a compensation order imposed following a public enforcement action should produce a deterrent effect. From a deterrence perspective it should make little difference whether a public enforcement action results in a fine or a compensation order, assuming that the quantum of the orders is the same. Equally, there should be little difference from a regulator's point of view between an order that requires a defendant to pay an amount as compensation and an order that requires a defendant to pay an amount as a fine. 88 As Hodges argues '[t]he concept that a public entity may deliver private remedies is merely the converse of the thesis that private bodies may deliver public enforcement.' 89 Writing in the context of the regulation of competition in the EU, Ezrachi and Ioannidou proposed the adoption by the member states of regimes that would provide 84 88 Although arguably greater stigma may be attached to a compensation order that is the result of a public enforcement action than a private enforcement action. 89 Hodges above n 87, 228.
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Volume 44 _____________________________________________________________________________________ what they termed 'public compensation.' 90 Under these regimes competition regulators could impose a compensation award in favour of the injured parties in addition to a fine, following an investigation. 91 Ezrachi and Ioannidou argued that public compensation would advance partial fusion of the compensatory function. Public compensation constitutes a hybrid approach to enforcement since it achieves a primarily private enforcement goal, that is compensation, through public enforcement mechanisms. At the same time though, it furthers deterrence as the primary goal of public enforcement. Thus, 'Public Compensation' transcends the dichotomy between public and private enforcement and the deterrence and compensation goals of competition law enforcement. 92 Therefore, in the phoenix context, the role of the publicly funded regulator should be to utilise the enforcement mechanisms at its disposal in strategic ways to reduce illegal behaviour by encouraging greater compliance with the relevant directors' duties. 93 Responsive regulation theory has much to say about how the goals of compliancefocused regulation should be achieved. 94 It requires regulators to choose from the available enforcement mechanisms the one that is most likely to encourage future compliance. The focus on future compliance requires public regulators to adopt a forward-looking approach, focused on changing future behaviour, rather than on achieving redress for victims of past contraventions. 95 Nonetheless, depriving wrongdoers of the fruits of their illegal phoenix activity can send a valuable message of deterrence to those contemplating similar behaviour in the future. Parker notes the effectiveness of compensation as both restorative justice and effective deterrence, saying that '[t]he ACCC experience … shows … that remedies or sanctions agreed through enforceable undertakings, such as victim compensation 90 Ezrachi and Ioannidou, above n 86, 537. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid 538 (citations omitted). 93 See ASIC Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2)(g) which provides that ASIC must strive to among other things 'take whatever action it can take, and is necessary, in order to enforce and give effect to the laws of the Commonwealth that confer functions and powers on it'. 94 
B An Expansive View of the Role of Public Regulation
Other commentators support a more expansive view of the role of a public regulator and argue that it should not be limited to simply securing compliance with the law and regulatory requirements. They argue that the role of a public regulator legitimately encompasses the seeking of compensation for victims of regulatory contraventions, regardless of whether this contributes to increased deterrence. For example, the Macrory Report describes the role of sanctions in the following terms:
Where regulatory non-compliance occurs, sanctions can ensure that businesses that have saved costs by non-compliance do not gain an unfair advantage over businesses that are fully compliant. Where breaches result in damage or other costs to society, sanctions can assist in ensuring that those in breach provide proper recompense. Sanctions can equally represent a societal condemnation of the regulatory breach, acting as a deterrent to the sanctioned business against future breaches, and sending a wider message to the regulated sector. 97 In developing the principles underlying regulatory sanctions, Macrory considered the five purposes of sentences in criminal matters to which the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK) requires UK courts to have regard. Those purposes included 'the making of reparation by offenders to those persons affected by their offences'. 98 Macrory argued that six principles should be adhered to by those who design sanctioning regimes for non-compliance. Regulatory sanctions should:
1. Aim to change the behaviour of the offender; 2. Aim to eliminate any financial gain or benefit from non-compliance; 3. Be responsive and consider what is appropriate for the particular offender and regulatory issue, which can include punishment and the public stigma that should be associated with a criminal conviction; 4. Be proportionate to the nature of the offence and the harm caused; 5. Aim to restore the harm caused by regulatory non-compliance, where appropriate; and 6. Aim to deter future non-compliance. 99 Principles one, three, four and six accord with the traditional view of the role of a public regulator. However, principles two and five envisage a wider role for the public regulator which could include seeking compensation for victims of the contravention, independent of any need to send a deterrent message. Macrory clearly had compensation in mind when he stated that principle five 'encompasses the needs of victims as well as ensuring that business offenders take responsibility for their actions and its consequences. 99 Ibid 10. 100 Ibid 31.
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Volume 44 _____________________________________________________________________________________ The Macrory Report notes that the responses to the Review's interim report, while broadly supportive of the draft principles, generally called for some flexibility in their application. For example, the Macrory Report refers to the submission from the Financial Services Authority in which it says:
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) suggest that although the principle is a relevant consideration, not all cases can or should include a restorative element. For example, in some cases it may not always be possible to quantify the losses suffered by an identifiable person and in others individual losses as a result of regulatory breaches are more efficiently and effectively redressed through individuals directly pursuing claims with the firm concerned (through the Financial Ombudsman Services or through the Financial Services Compensation Scheme). The FSA suggest that Principle #5 be qualified to make it clear that regulators need only consider whether a sanction should include a restorative element. 101
C ASIC's Compensation Power in the Context of Phoenix Activity
The civil penalty regime, which is at ASIC's disposal following duty breaches that occur in the phoenix context, allows for orders imposing a penalty, disqualification and compensation. Disqualification orders and pecuniary penalties both punish errant directors and act as a deterrent. The former also removes the director from the marketplace for the protection of future creditors. While the traditional role of compensation is to redress harm suffered by victims, the use of this order may also allow ASIC to achieve its objective of penalising wrongdoers, deterring future wrongdoing and securing increased compliance. The payment from the wrongdoer exerts the same punitive influence whether it is paid into consolidated revenue in the form of a pecuniary penalty, or to the victims of the wrongdoing in the form of compensation. Given the special difficulties faced by creditors in obtaining full payment of the monies owed to them in the phoenix context, there is a clear need for the public regulator to seek compensation from the directors personally when they have breached duties. If obtained, that compensation would be paid to the company and will increase the pool of funds that is available for distribution to creditors, particularly unsecured trade creditors who have no other champion. Arguably, this task fits both within the narrow compliance focused view as well the expansive view of the role of a public regulator.
However, this does not appear to be ASIC's approach. Its information statement on enforcement confirms that '[w]e can take enforcement action designed to punish wrongdoers, protect investors, preserve assets, correct disclosures or compensate people.' 102 Yet these actions are not equally recognised in the text that follows. Nearly a page is dedicated to 'punitive action' 103 whereas a single paragraph deals with compensation. That paragraph clearly states ASIC's approach to seeking a compensation order:
We have powers under s 50 of the ASIC Act to begin a representative action to recover damages or property for persons who have suffered loss. We will ordinarily only take action to recover damages or property on a person's behalf if this would be in the public interest, beyond the interests of the affected consumers. We encourage investors to consider alternative options to recover damages or property from wrongdoers where
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The Public Enforcement of Sanctions against Illegal Phoenix Activity 219 _____________________________________________________________________________________ possible, such as by lodging a dispute with the Financial Ombudsman Service or taking private legal action. 104 It is interesting that ASIC's statement does not even acknowledge its own powers to seek compensation for civil penalty breaches, nor the recovery of debt through a liquidator. The references to consumers, investors and the Financial Services Ombudsman seem to reflect a focus on market integrity and financial product complaints, rather than insolvency. It is also noteworthy that none of the other enforcement tools -punitive, protective, preservative or corrective action, negotiated resolutions or infringement notices -suggest that those with complaints seek redress elsewhere. It would therefore appear that ASIC's own view of its enforcement role is to achieve compliance or redress in some way other than seeking compensation for victims. It sends the message that ASIC does not want to be a source of private remedies for victims of corporate law breaches, even playing an ancillary role to that of the liquidator.
Yet drafters of the Corporate Law Reform Bill, which introduced civil penalty provisions into corporate law, were clearly of the view that seeking redress for victims was an appropriate role for a public regulator. 105 The relevant provisions of the Bill came about as a consequence of the Cooney Report in 1989. 106 It recommended that civil penalties be available for breaches by directors where no criminality is involved, and, in appropriate circumstances, people suffering loss as a result of a breach should be able to claim damages in the proceeding to recover the loss. 107 The purpose of the civil penalty provisions was to sanction misconduct falling short of a criminal offence. 108 Other Australian regulators have been given similar powers to seek compensation. 109 The explanatory memorandum to the Corporate Law Reform Bill acknowledged the possibility that the court could order punitive damages, which clearly recognises the dual role that compensation plays in redressing the wrong suffered by the victim while simultaneously punishing the wrongdoer. 110 Indeed, the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 (Cth) inserted s 1317HB into the predecessor of the Corporations Act. This section allowed a criminal court to order compensation where 'a court finds a person guilty of an offence constituted by a contravention of a civil penalty provision in relation to a corporation'. While this section has subsequently been repealed, 111 
Federal Law Review
Volume 44 _____________________________________________________________________________________ allows a criminal court to order compensation for insolvent trading. Insolvent trading, it should be recalled, includes uncommercial transactions where assets are transferred for undervalue. A criminal action can only be brought at the behest of the regulator.
However, to date ASIC has not used its power to seek a compensation order in the phoenix context. While ASIC has published data about enforcement since July 2011, 112 it does not report which enforcement actions relate to phoenix activity. Therefore, other means had to be found to determine the level of its enforcement. This included searching a number of publicly available sources. 113 The search began by looking at the Austlii case database and the ASIC's media releases from 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2014. These searches revealed that during this period ASIC issued civil penalty applications alleging a breach of duty on 19 separate occasions. 114 In only one of those applications did the facts giving rise to the alleged breach of duty amount to illegal phoenix activity. This civil penalty application sought declarations of contravention, restraining orders and disqualification orders. 115 Compensation was not sought by the regulator, and there is no explanation in the ASIC media release or the case report itself as to why ASIC only sought declarations and injunctions against the parties involved. 116 This is despite the fact that the case has numerous references to unsatisfied statutory demands issued by the ATO and a workers' compensation insurer. 117 In addition, ASIC's media releases and an accompanying search of the Austlii database did not reveal any ASIC applications commenced between 2004 and 2014 alleging directors had engaged in insolvent trading in breach of Corporations Act s 588G(2) in circumstances that may have involved illegal phoenix activity. It should be noted here that ASIC is not the only party that can bring action under s 588G, as liquidators may do so either in relation to insolvent trading itself 118 or for 'deemed' insolvent trading where the directors have entered into an uncommercial transaction within the meaning of s 588FB. 119 The latter typically describes the circumstances of an undervalued asset transfer during phoenix activity. However, it is highly unlikely that the liquidator will bring action of this nature because phoenixed companies typically
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The Public Enforcement of Sanctions against Illegal Phoenix Activity 221 _____________________________________________________________________________________ have few or no assets to fund recovery litigation. 120 Even if the liquidator does bring the action, it would only benefit the individual creditors of a specific company and may be unheard of beyond those circles. If ASIC brings the action, the public benefit of deterrence can also be achieved through the publicising of the case.
ASIC does disqualify directors involved in phoenix activity but even those instances are relatively few. 121 Our searches revealed that between 1 January 2004 and 30 June 2014, ASIC disqualified 51 directors in circumstances involving phoenix activity. 122 However, where ASIC does disqualify a director, it is often in circumstances where wrongful behaviour in addition to the phoenixing has occurred. For example, an ASIC media release recently recounted the disqualification of a Sydney director by ASIC. 123 It stated that '[t]he disqualification follows an ASIC investigation which found that Mr Teys breached his duties as a director, including failing to comply with financial services laws.' 124 He had been the director of three liquidated companies, one of which operated as an incorporated legal practice. It stated that Mr Teys had managed the companies 'such that each incurred a deficiency', that the incorporated legal practice had 'preferred trade creditors over the ATO and in so doing acted with a lack of commercial morality', that Mr Teys had '[u]sed his position as a director of Teys Lawyers and TPL improperly to gain financial advantages for himself and other related parties' and that several breaches of the duty of care had also occurred. 125 The three company's deficiencies to creditors were in excess of $5 million. 126 The media release quoted ASIC Commissioner Greg Tanzer as saying '[d]irectors have a responsibility to manage the financial affairs of their company in accordance with the law. As this case shows, directors who cause or permit their company to breach legal obligations can face significant consequences.' Mr Teys has been banned from managing
Federal Law Review
Volume 44 _____________________________________________________________________________________ corporations for five years, the maximum amount allowable under ASIC's administrative disqualification power.
The lack of applications for compensation by ASIC in the case of phoenix activity echoes ASIC's other civil penalty applications alleging breaches of duty that do not involve phoenix activity. A 2014 study into ASIC's use of the civil penalty regime revealed that the regulator has issued a total of 38 civil penalty applications alleging a breach of the directors' duties between 1993, when this enforcement regime was introduced, and 2014. 127 In only 11 of those cases did the regulator seek a compensation order, and it has never been the sole order sought. 128 Disqualification orders were sought in 32 cases and pecuniary penalties were sought in 26 cases. 129 Seeking compensation is clearly not ASIC's priority when it issues these applications, and this appears to be increasingly the case with the last compensation order being sought in 2006. 130 So while ASIC's powers to seek compensation of behalf of creditors could theoretically assist them, in reality this has not occurred.
One can only speculate as to why ASIC has chosen this path. This might be because seeking compensation could delay the resolution of public enforcement actions and place additional financial burdens on the regulator. 131 It is certainly understandable that ASIC may be reluctant to raise expectations in that regard. It may also be concerned not to be seen as the hero for some creditors but not for others. However, ASIC already undeniably disappoints creditors in terms of any of the actions it brings. The 2014-2015 external administrator statistics compiled by ASIC showed 16,279 reports of suspected civil misconduct. 132 Enforcement statistics for the second six months of that period show that across all of ASIC's operations, it '(a) commenced 136 investigations; (b) completed 137 investigations; (c) charged 10 individuals with a total of 82 criminal charges; (d) banned 25 individuals from the financial services or credit industries; (e) accepted six enforceable undertakings; and (f) disqualified 19 directors.' 133 A recent Productivity Commission report commented that 'rather than crafting new offences, improvements in the detection and enforcement of existing laws are likely to be the best option for creating a genuine disincentive for directors contemplating phoenix action.' 134 Perhaps it is simply a matter of ASIC's enforcement priorities being elsewhere. 135 In relation to their 'Priority 1: Investor and financial consumer trust and confidence', 136 ASIC obtained '$36.1 million in total compensation or remediation … for investors and financial consumers' 137 and raised $18,975,000 in penalties through civil penalty
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The Public Enforcement of Sanctions against Illegal Phoenix Activity 223 _____________________________________________________________________________________ action. 138 In contrast, in relation to 'Priority 2: Fair, orderly, transparent and efficient markets', 139 which covers the insolvency area amongst other things, ASIC did not obtain any pecuniary penalties and only $943,418 as '[c]ompensation or remediation secured for investors and financial consumers'. 140 Our searches indicate that none of this compensation relates to actions in relation to illegal phoenix activity.
It is also possible that ASIC's lack of response to misconduct in the insolvency context is symptomatic of wider problems. ASIC was criticised extensively in the Senate Economics References Committee report considering ASIC's performance in 2014. The committee commented that 'ASIC has limited powers and resources but even so appears to miss or ignore clear and persistent early warning signs of corporate wrongdoing'. 141 The committee's report outlined 10 pages of complaints about ASIC's response to complaints and reports of misconduct, 142 following which the committee stated that it had 'received many other complaints that are too numerous to detail here about ASIC's supposedly inadequate response.' 143 The committee recommended a system by which external administrators could indicate to ASIC which reports required 'the most urgent attention and investigation' 144 but the recommendation was simply 'noted' by the government. It stated that ASIC 'has worked, and continues to work' on its own systems to identify statutory reports requiring urgent attention. 145 One relevant area of enforcement that ASIC has pursued involves the conduct of liquidators themselves. 146 Part III above noted that creditors' recovery could be adversely affected by advisors who are themselves accessories to the phoenix activity of their clients. ASIC maintains that liquidators are the gatekeepers here 147 and should bring actions against directors for breaches of duty and for recovery of payments improperly made prior to liquidation. ASIC's response 148 is undoubtedly a result of the
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Volume 44 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 2010 Senate inquiry into insolvency practitioners. 149 Since 2012, ASIC has released an annual report into the regulation of registered liquidators. 150 This summarises the complaints made against liquidators and the action that ASIC took in response. It is noteworthy that there is no equivalent document that tallies complaints about company officers, made through external administrators' statutory reports, with actions taken against those officers. The only enforcement reporting that ASIC provides is of a general nature that does not allow matching of complaints against enforcement. 151 In addition, since 2013, ASIC has undertaken a project to test all registered liquidators' compliance with requirements to publish notices and lodge documents, and the results are then published. 152 
V CONCLUSION
The victims of illegal phoenix activity include the ATO, state revenue authorities, employees, trade creditors and competitors. There are a number of difficulties faced by these victims in seeking redress for their losses. Those difficulties arise as a result of many factors that include the limited liability that is enjoyed by companies and exploited in the phoenix context, the rules regulating the distribution of funds in insolvency, the limitations faced by liquidators, the absence of a specific phoenix offence and a lack of standing to enforce breaches of the directors' duties that may occur in the insolvency context. While some differences between creditors arise, the grievance that is suffered by most unsecured creditors is the non-payment of debts in full by an insolvent company from which assets have been stripped at undervalue. One way of improving their position in this context is to increase the pool of funds available for distribution to unsecured creditors by seeking compensation from directors personally.
Both the liquidator and ASIC can issue proceedings seeking compensation against directors that have phoenixed their companies. However, practical difficulties faced by liquidators mean that these types of actions are issued infrequently. Assisting creditors by seeking compensation orders against directors who have phoenixed their companies can be an appropriate use of ASIC's resources, especially where doing so does not detract from its traditional enforcement role. We acknowledge that the issue of ASIC's reluctance to seek compensation is not unique to the insolvency or phoenix situation, but the need for the regulator to act is particularly acute in the phoenix context because of the limited rights that creditors have to act on their own behalf. However, the data
